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7 NOV 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science and Technology

SUBJECT : Advanced Reconnaissance System - Concept Formulation

Schedule commitments may preclude our presentation to you of the Advanced Reconnaissance System Study Plan briefing prior to the EXCOM meeting on 13 November. In view of this, I have taken the liberty to attach hereto an informal copy of the Deputy for Research and Development submission to Comptroller, OSA. If time permits prior to EXCOM, your perusal will give you the substance of our approach to the study effort called for by the D/NRO. We are ready at any time to present this briefing to you or to transpose this internal document into appropriate form for DD/S&T submission to D/NRO.

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JOHN PARANGOSKY

Deputy Director of Special Activities

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NRO review(s) completed.

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[REDACTED]
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3. It is requested that funds in the amount of [REDACTED] be allocated to CIA, for use in FY-69, for the concept formulation phase of an Advanced Aerodynamic Reconnaissance System, under the General Research and Development (Aircraft) program.

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[REDACTED]
Deputy for
Research and Development
Special Activities

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Attachment:
As stated

25X1 ASD/R&D/OSA [REDACTED] 5 Nov 1968

Distribution:

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PROGRAM DESCRIPTION**I. TITLE**

Concept Formulation Phase of an Advanced
Aerodynamic Reconnaissance System

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REFERENCE

[] dtd 5 Sept 1967, "Funding
Request for Certain FY-68 General R&D
(Aircraft) Activities"

II. OBJECTIVE

To explore various methods of achieving
a survivable quick-reaction reconnaissance
capability. Primary objective would be
to survive in the lethal envelopes of
projected Sovbloc and other defensive
environments through the 1975 - 1980 period.
Elements of the task encompass items
3 and 4 of the referenced memorandum.

III. BACKGROUND

In anticipation of approval for this
study, the Office of Scientific Intelligence
(OSI) was requested to provide their
most realistic estimate of the Soviet
Bloc and the non-Soviet Bloc defensive
environments for the 1975 - 1980 period.
A summary of the results of the OSI effort
are presented in Exhibit (A). These
results in Exhibit (A) together with the
quick reaction capability as stipulated
by USIB for the indications satellite,
Exhibit (B), are used to establish an
approach to the problem.

IV. APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM

Survivability would be considered as
two distinct environments, i.e., Soviet
Bloc and non-Soviet Bloc. Exhibit (C)
identifies how each of these two en-
vironments would be investigated. Since
a "wait and see" approach is recommended
for the non-Soviet Bloc environment, the
effort for FY-69 reduces to concentrating
only on the Soviet Bloc task. This task

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would be performed in sequence by a "Think Group" and then an Airframe contractor. The proposed program organization and elements of the task are shown in Exhibits (D) and (E).

V. ELEMENTS OF THE TASK

The elements of the task would encompass the specifics as outlined in Exhibit (F). Further amplification of this exhibit is noted below:

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a. Profiles and Tactics - Using the [redacted] as the limiting minimum envelope, investigate maximum capable concepts. Implicit in the development of these concepts will be the realization that future defensive systems expected 10 years hence can only be postulated. Therefore, the sensitivity of survival to variation in defensive system performance parameters must be considered. All conceivable and potentially feasible vehicle profiles and tactics would be considered for survivability. No technological constraints would be imposed on either altitude or speed. Also realistic maneuvers, as they effect the engagement geometry between the SAM and the vehicle, would be evaluated.

b. Candidate Concept Survey - Based on using viable profiles and tactics developed above, this survey should ideally result in one or more concepts. This segment would be the sole responsibility of the airframe contractor under Headquarters direction.

Flight Modes - All modes would be examined to determine if one or more emerges as a superior approach. The launch phase would include investigating

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vehicles which are air launched, ground launched, boosted or self-accelerators. The significant, i.e., intelligence gathering phase, would consider but not be restricted to glide, powered, throttling techniques, high-altitude, low altitude and combinations thereof and speeds to encompass from hypersonic to sub-sonic in consonance with the profiles and tactics.

Technology - The contractor would avail himself of the latest materials, manufacturing and engineering technology. All of the technology derived from previous programs would be considered so as not to "replow old ground." The most futuristic NASA data would be considered for applicability.

Operational Considerations - The case of manned vs. unmanned would be considered in depth with all compromises both from the vehicle design standpoint and from the cost and reliability standpoint being weighed. The type of launch and the basing facilities would be reviewed as they effect the design capability. Considerations necessary to maintain a covert program would be addressed.

c. Analysis - A determination/assessment of how well each concept meets the problem would result from this phase of the task.

Force Fit - It is highly unlikely that any one design would prove superior in all aspects and certain weight would have to be given to the various aspects of the problem during the analysis.

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Reaction - Any intelligence collection system is useful only if the data are available to the users on a "soonest" basis. Therefore, the quick-reaction ability of the concepts would be given prime consideration. Both the reaction time for the actual collection of the data and also the subsequent steps necessary for processing, etc., would be a part of the study.

Man Value - Since politically an unmanned vehicle would be much more palatable, the presence of a man must prove to be of extreme value from the reliability and mission success standpoint if selected. Perhaps the man might be present only during the test phase with the vehicle being droned operationally.

Cost - Naturally any large expenditure of funds committed for intelligence collection can only be justified if (a) a requirement for the intelligence exists, (b) the concept has a high chance of success of obtaining the data and (c) a more reliable, less costly, more politically acceptable approach doesn't exist. Therefore, in the analysis, it is envisioned that both the Airframe Contractor and Headquarters would have an input.

d. **Answer** - This phase of the task would represent the end result of the effort. Only if the results clearly indicated that both survivability and quick reaction were potentially feasible and practically achievable, would consideration be given to a follow-on effort to include confirmation of system designs and the investigation of basic technology in certain critical areas.

VI. The contractor candidates would be selected in accordance with the criteria of Exhibit (G). A cost and schedule estimate is presented in Exhibit (H).

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DEFINITION OF QUICK REACTION

TWENTY-FIVE HOUR ELAPSED TIME INCREMENT FROM
OFFICIAL REQUEST FOR RECONNAISSANCE COVERAGE TO
RECEIPT OF PROCESSED PRODUCT BY INTERPRETERS.

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
EXHIBIT (B) - 51

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PROJECTED RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS

SOVIET BLOC



NON-SOVIET BLOC

FOLLOW TAGBOARD PROGRESS FOR ONE YEAR

IF SATISFACTORY, INVESTIGATE MODS TO TAGBOARD TO IMPROVE
ALTITUDE.

IF UNSATISFACTORY, INVESTIGATE MODS TO A-12/SR-71 FAMILY
TO IMPROVE ALTITUDE.

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EXHIBIT (C)

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PROGRAM ORGANIZATION FOR SOVIET-BLOC STUDY

THINK GROUP - Based on reconnaissance targets and ground rules, identify PROFILES AND TACTICS. Options to be rated in order of preference.

HEADQUARTERS - PROFILES AND TACTICS to be selected based on think group data plus in-house assessment.

AIRFRAME MANUFACTURER - Technological survey of all potential CANDIDATE CONCEPTS compatible with PROFILES AND TACTICS.
- ANALYSIS of concepts to provide rating in order of preference with supporting data.

HEADQUARTERS - Review and final judgement.

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EXHIBIT (D)

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ELEMENTS OF THE TASK

1. PROFILES AND TACTICS - THINK GROUP
2. CANDIDATE CONCEPT SURVEY - AIRFRAME MANUFACTURER
3. ANALYSIS - AIRFRAME MANUFACTURER/HEADQUARTERS
4. ANSWER - AIRFRAME MANUFACTURER/HEADQUARTERS

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(E)

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I. PROFILES AND TACTICS

LOW TO HIGH ALTITUDES

SUBSONIC TO HYPERSONIC SPEEDS

MANEUVERABILITY

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2. CANDIDATE CONCEPT SURVEY

FLIGHT MODES - AIR LAUNCHED VS. GROUND LAUNCHED
BOOSTED VS. SELF-ACCELERATION
GLIDE, POWERED, THROTTLING TECHNIQUES

TECHNOLOGY - OXCART
ISINGLASS

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 GENERAL DYNAMICS STUDY

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS - MANNED VS. UNMANNED
TYPE OF LAUNCH
BASING FACILITIES
COVERT OPERATION

SENSOR CONSIDERATIONS - BROAD SPECIFICATIONS FOR WEIGHT AND
VOLUME ALLOTMENT

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3. ANALYSIS

FORCE FIT - CANDIDATE CONFIGURATIONS RELATIVE TO WEIGHTING OF
VARIOUS ASPECTS OF PROBLEM

REACTION - TIME FOR COLLECTION OF DATA

TIME FOR PROCESSING AND DELIVERY TO INTERPRETER

MAN VALUE - IMPACT ON RELIABILITY AND MISSION SUCCESS

POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

CONSIDER MAN ONLY DURING TEST PHASE

COST - JUSTIFIED ONLY IF:

A. REQUIREMENT EXISTS

B. ACCEPTABLE PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS

C. NO MORE RELIABLE, LESS COSTLY, MORE POLITICALLY
ACCEPTABLE APPROACH

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4. ANSWER

- A. SURVIVABILITY POSSIBLE?
- B. QUICK REACTION POSSIBLE?
- C. IF BOTH A AND B POSSIBLE, DEVELOP PLAN

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EXHIBIT (F)

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IV. CONTRACTOR CANDIDATES
CRITERIA FOR SELECTION

THINK GROUP

- * AERODYNAMIC TYPE VEHICLE EXPERIENCE
- * VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS EXPERIENCE
- * TACTICS/ENGAGEMENT ANALYSIS EXPERIENCE

LOCATION OF FACILITY

SECURITY CLEARANCE CONSIDERATIONS

COST

TIME

AIRFRAME/SYSTEMS

DEPENDENT UPON RESULTS OF THINK GROUP EFFORT.

SPECIFIC FLIGHT REGIME EXPERIENCE

HARDWARE VS. DESIGN STUDY

PROGRAM SUCCESSES

PREVIOUS RECONNAISSANCE VEHICLE EXPERIENCE

PREVIOUS AGENCY AFFILIATION.

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EXHIBIT (G)

FY 69

-FY 70

DEC|JAN|FEB|MAR|APR|MAY|JUN|JUL|AUG|SEPT

THINK GROUP.

AIRFRAME CONTRACTOR

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EXHIBIT (H)

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